Tort Law: False Imprisonment
False Imprisonment
The action of false imprisonment descends from the the common law writ of trespass and is one of the oldest causes of action in our legal system. An action for false imprisonment is intended to compensate an injured plaintiff whose freedom of movement has been unjustifiably hindered. In other words, when an individual is restrained without legal justification from going where he or she has a right to go, the individual may assert a cause of action for false imprisonment and is entitled to recover money damages.
The elements of a cause of action for false imprisonment are the (1) the willful detention of a person (2) without justification or authority of law and (3) against the person’s consent.
- The willful detention of a person
The intent to interfere with an individual’s freedom of movement is an essential element of the tort of false imprisonment. Any intentional conduct that “results in the placing of a person in a position where he cannot exercise his will in going where he may lawfully go” constitutes false imprisonment. Intent can be determined by words or conduct, or by a combination of words and conduct, that prevent a person from moving from one place to another.
It is not necessary to show that the defendant intended an unlawful detainment; it need only be shown that the detention itself was unlawful. Therefore, the defendant is not exempt from liability by the fact that he or she acted in ignorance. Moreover, it is not a defense to a claim of false imprisonment that the defendant acted without malice.
- Without justification or authority of law
The absence of adequate justification or authority of law is an essential element of a cause of action for false imprisonment. “Authority of law” is a term used to denote a privilege based on a legislative enactment, for example, the authority of a shopkeeper to detain an individual whom he or she suspects of shoplifting. “Justification,” on the other hand, is generally based on a common-law precept, for example, the authority of an employer to detain an employee for a reasonable period of time and for a reasonable investigation when the employee is suspected of stealing. The term “legal justification” is not a technical one and need not be defined to the jury.
Ordinarily, a detention or imprisonment is presumed to be without justification or adequate legal authority unless the contrary appears. The burden is on the defendant to go forward with evidence that the arrest or detention was legally justified. This presumption does not apply, however, when an arrest or detention is made pursuant to a valid arrest warrant or a subpoena.
- Against the person’s consent
An intentional and unjustified or unauthorized interference with an individual’s freedom of movement does not constitute false imprisonment unless it is against the individual’s will, that is, without the individual’s consent. Proof that the plaintiff voluntarily agreed to the detention will defeat an action for false imprisonment. If the evidence shows that the plaintiff, in an attempt to prove his or her innocence, voluntarily complies with a request to remain, or should not reasonably have been fearful of the defendant or the defendant’s representative because of size, age, sex, or demeanor in general, the detention will not amount to false imprisonment as a matter of law.
Consent may be inferred from the plaintiff’s conduct. Generally, whether the plaintiff’s conduct amounts to implied consent is a question of fact for the jury, with the determining factor being whether, in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances, a reasonable person would have interpreted plaintiff’s conduct as the equivalent of consent.
If the defendant presents evidence that the plaintiff gave his or her consent, the plaintiff may nevertheless overcome the defense by showing that he or she was coerced or intimidated into consenting. Coercion may be established by showing that the defendant used physical violence, assault, or threats to prevent the plaintiff from freely moving about. Whether the plaintiff had a reasonable means of escape is relevant in this regard. If the facts show that the plaintiff’s objections would have been hopeless or that he or she had no reasonable means of escape, the resulting silence and apparent submission will not be the equivalent of consent.
When plaintiff’s movement is interfered with by an alleged threat, the plaintiff must establish that the threat was of a degree to inspire a just fear of injury to the plaintiff’s person, reputation or property. The issue is whether the plaintiff had a just fear of injury, not whether the plaintiff had a subjective belief that he or she was restrained. In most cases, whether a threat was sufficient to inspire a just fear of injury is a question of fact.
Factors to be considered in this regard include the relationship between the parties, the circumstances surrounding the incident, the actual words spoken, and the relative size, age, experience, sex, and physical demeanor of the participants. For example, an 18-year-old female store employee with a 10th-grade education and a two-year-old child did not consent to detention by the store manager and a store security officer who threatened to handcuff her, put her in jail, and prevent her from seeing her child for a long time, even though she was not physically prevented from leaving and did not refuse to answer questions or ask to leave. The lack of consent was based on the plaintiff’s lack of business experience and the harsh and intimidating nature of her questioning.
In contrast, a 45-year-old businessman, who admitted himself to an in-patient alcoholic treatment program after an “intervention” in which he was allegedly told that he would be committed and brought to the hospital in handcuffs if he did not do so, but who was not physically restrained or intimidated in any other way, was not detained at the hospital against his will because there was nothing to suggest that his weakness or susceptibility to intimidation excused his failure to insist on leaving when he felt he was falsely imprisoned.
Threats of future action, such as to call the police and have the plaintiff arrested, are not ordinarily sufficient in themselves to effect an unlawful imprisonment. On the other hand, if the police were actually called and the plaintiff was told not to leave, the plaintiff may have been detained without consent.
Whether plaintiff must be aware that his or her personal freedom of movement has been interrupted is an issue on which there is no direct authority. Some jurisdictions have taken the position that this is a necessary element in a false imprisonment case. The rationale for this view is that false imprisonment concerns an individual’s freedom to go where he or she pleases and unless the individual is aware of such a restraint there is no real interference with this freedom. Others have suggested that a plaintiff should be able to recover regardless of whether he or she is aware of the restraint. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated in dicta that awareness is an element of false imprisonment.
A common defense to false imprisonment is the “merchant’s defense,” or “shopkeeper’s privilege”.
Under the “shopkeeper’s privilege,” a person reasonably believing that another has stolen, or is attempting to steal, property, may detain that person in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable time to investigate ownership of the property. A reasonable belief under the statute requires something less than probable cause, but more than unfounded suspicion. The person exercising the privilege need not confirm or refute the detainee’s claims and may hold the detainee for a reasonable time in order to deliver him or her to the police. The reasonableness of a detention is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the detention.
A plaintiff found to have been falsely imprisoned is entitled to compensatory damages for all of his or her injuries resulting from the imprisonment, both tangible and intangible. This includes expenses incurred as a result of the imprisonment, as well as compensation for damage to the plaintiff’s reputation and physical and mental suffering. The plaintiff is entitled to claim expenses such as attorney’s fees and other reasonable expenses incurred in freeing himself or herself from false imprisonment, lost wages, and diminution of earning capacity. Mental suffering caused by a false imprisonment, including humiliation, shame, fright, and anguish, is also compensable, regardless of whether any physical hurt was inflicted on the plaintiff.
The plaintiff may recover for physical and mental suffering caused by the plaintiff’s physical discomfort during the period of false imprisonment. This includes discomfort caused by the treatment of the plaintiff at the jail and the condition of the jail, regardless of whether the false imprisonment was instigated by a law enforcement officer or a private citizen. Moreover, discomfort that results as a natural consequence of the false imprisonment and is proximately related to the false imprisonment is compensable even if it is caused by the enforcement of reasonable rules of jail discipline.
Once actual damages are established, exemplary damages may also be recovered if it is shown that the defendant acted in a reckless, willful or malicious manner, and intended to oppress or injure the plaintiff
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